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Abstract
In recent years it has become apparent that we must take unobservable heterogeneity into account
when conducting empirical consumer demand analysis. This paper is concerned with integrability
(that is, whether demand is consistent with utility maximization) of the conditional mean demand
(that is, the estimated demand) when allowing for unobservable heterogeneity. Integrability is impor-
tant because it is necessary in order for the demand system estimates to be used for welfare analysis.
Conditions for conditional mean demand to be integrable in the presence of unobservable heterogene-
ity are developed in the literature. There is, however, little empirical evidence suggesting whether
these conditions for integrability are likely to be met in the data or not. In this paper we exploit the
fact that the integrability conditions have testable implications for panel data and use a unique long
panel data set to test them. Because of the sizeable longitudinal length of the panel, we are able to
identify a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation of unobservable heterogeneity: We model individual demands as
an Almost Ideal Demand system and allow for unobservable heterogeneity by allowing all intercept
and slope parameters of the demand system to be individual-speciﬁc. We test the conditions for
integrability of the conditional mean demand of this demand system. We do not reject them. This
means that the conditional mean demand generated by a population of consumers with diﬀerent pref-
erences described by diﬀerent Almost Ideal Demand systems is consistent with utility maximization.
Given that integrability is not rejected, we conclude by an comparing the estimated demand system
elasticties and welfare eﬀects from a model with no heterogeneity (which is the model that would
usually be estimated from cross sectional data) to those obtained from our heterogeneous model. We
ﬁnd that the homogeneous model severely overestimates income elasticities for luxury goods and that
the welfare eﬀects from the heterogeneous model exhibit a large amount of heterogeneity, but deviate
with only a few percentage points from the homogeneous model at the mean.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Demand system estimation provides estimates of price and income elasticities, as well as estimates of
the eﬀects of demographic variables on demands. These elasticities and eﬀects are important inputs into
many policy analyses; for example the analysis of the eﬀects of income or commodity taxes on market
demands and the implications these eﬀects have for welfare. Indeed, one of the main motivations for
estimating demand systems is to facilitate welfare analysis. For this it is necessary that demands are
consistent with consumer theory; that is, it is necessary that demands are integrable1.
In this paper we exploit a unique data set to test conditions that are necessary for the conditional mean
demand function across consumers to be integrable, assuming that individual consumers all separately
maximise utility. The conditional mean demand is of great importance in empirical demand analysis
because this is the demand that is estimated: When we estimate a demand system, what we estimate is
always the average demand, conditional on observables. To see this, consider the usual way of modelling
and estimating demand systems. The usual way of modelling demand systems is by an additive model:
The demand of each individual is modelled as the sum of a systematic component, i.e. some function,
and an additive error term. The systematic component is functionally dependent on observables, like
prices, incomes and observable demographics, and is common for all individuals: Diﬀerent individuals have
diﬀerent values of observables, but the systematic component is the same function for all individuals. The
error term is functionally independent of observables and is speciﬁc to each individual. The systematic
component is then estimated from data, typically employing the assumption that the additive error term
has conditional mean zero. This, together with the conditional mean zero condition on error terms,
implicitly deﬁnes the systematic component to be the average budget share function. This means that
what is in fact being estimated is the conditional mean budget share function. In order to use the
estimated coeﬃcients from a demand system for welfare analysis we thus need the conditional mean
demand to be integrable.
There is a vast literature on demand system estimation and this literature provides an abundance
of diﬀerent ways of specifying the conditional mean demand to be estimated, both parametrically and
nonparametrically. Widely used examples of parametric speciﬁcations are the Almost Ideal Demand
system (introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)) and the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand system
(introduced by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997)). Nonparametric speciﬁcations include Härdle and
Jerison (1988), Lewbel (1991), Blundell, Duncan and Pendakur (1998) and Blundell, Chen and Kristensen
(2007). The data used for demand system estimation is nowadays typically cross sectional household
expenditure survey data, that is, data at the household level, where each household is observed only
once. A couple of decades ago demand systems were estimated using aggregate data; thus Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) used aggregate data. Regardless of whether data is aggregate level data or household
level data, and regardless of whether the demand system is parametrically or nonparametrically estimated,
what is always estimated is the conditional mean demand.
When modelling demand systems in the usual way, unobservable individual-level heterogeneity is
1By the term ”integrability” we will understand that demand is generated from maximising a utility function subject to
a linear budget constraint.
2assumed to be captured in the additive, individual-speciﬁc error term, which is not taken into account
when the integrability properties of the demand system are analysed. In recent years, however, it has
become widely acknowledged that we must take unobservable heterogeneity into account when conducting
empirical consumer demand analysis. In an early paper, Brown and Walker (1989) consider the additive
demand model and show that in order for integrability to hold at both the individual and the average
level, the individual error terms must be functionally dependent on prices and/or incomes. In other
words: If we want integrability to hold both at the individual level and at the average level, we can not
employ the usual modelling of demand systems with additive independent error terms. In contrast to the
usual way of modelling demand systems, the random utility approach takes unobservable heterogeneity
speciﬁcally into account by letting a random component either enter the individual utility maximization
problem directly, or letting it enter the demand system. The idea is that each consumer has his or her
own value of the random component (coeﬃcient) and hence the distribution of the random coeﬃcients
represents the distribuition of preference heterogeneity. Each consumer knows his or her own value of
t h er a n d o mc o e ﬃcient, but this value is unknown to the researcher. In a recent paper, Lewbel (2001)
adopts the random utility approach to the usual additive model and derives conditions under which the
conditional mean demand is integrable, assuming that individual demands are integrable. The conditions
imply the result of Brown and Walker (1989). These integrability conditions are conditions on a matrix
whose elements are covariances across individuals (households) between individual income responses and
individual demands and hence they have testable implications for panel data: The conditions can be
tested as properties of an estimate of the matrix of covariances. Because each element of the matrix is a
covariance across individuals (households) between individual income responses and individual demands,
this matrix can be estimated from panel data by a simple two step procedure. In a ﬁrst step, the time
s e r i e sv a r i a t i o no ft h ed a t ac a nb eu s e dt oe s t i m a t et he individual income responses and the individual
demands for all individuals. In a second step, the cross sectional variation in the data can be used to
estimate the elements of the matrix of covariances as the sample covariances across households of the
estimated individual eﬀects.
In this paper, we exploit the unique long time series dimension of a Spanish panel data set on house-
holds expenditures to empirically test the integrability conditions developed in Lewbel (2001), following
the two step procedure outlined above. The data is the Encuesta Permanente de Consumo (the ECP),
which is a 6 year long data set with quarterly information on household expenditures, on prices and on
demographics, collected by the Spanish National Bureau of Statistics in the period 1978-83 2.T h eE C P
is to the best of our knowledge the longest real panel on households consumption covering a wide range
of commodity groups we have available. The exceptional long time-series dimension allows us to estimate
the individual income responses and individual demands that are needed for each household in order
to construct an estimate of the matrix of covariances. It also allows us to be far more ﬂexible in our
speciﬁcation of preference heterogeneity than other studies estimating demand systems with unobservable
heterogeneity.
We take a semiparametric approach and model the demand of each household by an Almost Ideal
2The data was kindly provided by Lola Collado. Many thanks to her for answering numerous queries about the data.
Also thanks to José M. Labeaga for help with this data.
3Demand system. The Almost Ideal Demand system has linear Engel curves in log total expenditure.
We introduce preference heterogeneity by allowing all the intercept and slope parameters of the Engel
curves to be household-speciﬁc, but we impose no parametric restrictions on the distribution of preference
parameters. Identiﬁcation of such a ﬂexible heterogeneity scheme is possible only because we have this
long panel data. The idea is to view the time series dimension for each household as a repetetion of the
same thing. This is justiﬁed by the theory underlying demand systems: Demand systems are models
of consumer behavior that describe how consumers allocate total expenditures to consumption goods
within the period, given that consumers have already allocated a given amount of total expenditure to
each period by solving an intra-temporal optimastion problem3. In other words, demand systems are
static models and thus we have no dynamics in our model. We test for integrability and ﬁnd that we
can not reject integrability. Furthermore, this non-rejection is fairly signiﬁcant with p-values as high as
ﬁfty percent. This ﬁnding implies that a set of completely heterogeneous Almost Ideal Demand systems
generate an integrable conditional mean demand. The value of having integrable demands is that it
fascilitates welfare analysis. Suppose for example that the government increases the tax on Alcohol &
Tobacco; from the demand system estimates alone we can assess quantitatively how demands will change
following the tax increase, but in order to assess how the welfare of the consumers change, we need a
utility framework. Given that integrability is not rejected, we know that the conditional mean demand
is generated by utility maximisation of some utility function. But as mentioned above, we do not know
what this utility function looks like (and it is beyond the scope of this paper to ﬁnd out). We therefore
calculate the welfare eﬀects at the individual level for each household, utilising that each household is
maximising an Almost Ideal utility function. We consider a tax increase that leads to the price of Food,
Alcohol & Tobacco to increase by 20% and estimate the compensating variations for each household, using
that household’s particular utility function, conditional on income. We then compare the means of these
conditional distributions of compensating variations to the compensating variation obtained from an AID
model with no unobservable heterogeneity. This is interesting because the model with heterogeneity is
the model that would usually be estimated from cross sectional data. We ﬁnd that that compensating
variations from the homogeneous model slightly undercompensates consumers as compared to the mean
of welfare eﬀects estimated from the heterogeneous model, but they are not very diﬀerent. However,
the substantial amount of heterogeneity in the welfare eﬀects from the heterogeneous model highlights
the importance of taking unobservable heterogeneity into account. Carrying out a similar comparison of
demand system estimates of price and income elasticities estimated from the two models show that the
homogeneous model severely overestimates income elasticities for luxury goods. This could be because
the homogeneous model wrongly contributes all of the v a r i a t i o ni nb u d g e ts h a r e st oi n c o m e ,w h e ni nf a c t
some of the variation is due to taste diﬀerences. This last result is in line with the ﬁndings of Christensen
(2005).
Among our other ﬁndings are however some strong rejections of homogeneous consumer behavior: We
strongly reject that diﬀerent consumers have identical income eﬀects. That is, we ﬁnd strong evidence of
preference heterogeneity in marginal propensities to spend. We also strongly reject that the intercepts
are identical across consumers. Both these rejections of homogeneous consumer behavior are in stark
3Demand systems are thus the second stage of a two stage budgeting process, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
4contrast to what is usually assumed in demand system estimation: Usually, it is assumed that these
behavioral coeﬃcients are identical across consumers - at most it is assumed that income responses can
vary with observable demographics (the classic example is to allow income repsonses to be diﬀerent
according to number of children in the household). But our ﬁnding suggests that this is not enough
to explain the variation in budget shares. Our ﬁndings thus also adds to the growing body of research
which shows the importance of taking unobservable heterogeneity into account. This is also evident when
comparing our estimates of income elasticities for a model estimated the usual way (i.e. allowing no
unobservable heterogeneity) to the estimates we obtain from the conditional mean demand generated
from our heterogeneous demand system: The income elasticities for luxury goods are in magnitude far
smaller in the heterogeneous model than in the model with no heterogeneity. This could be because some
of the variation in the budget shares of these goods in the homogeneous model was wrongly contributed
to income, when in fact it was a taste diﬀerence, thus leading to the income eﬀects being overestimated
in the homogeneous model.
Few other papers have looked at integrability of demand systems when accounting for unobservable
heterogeneity. Hoderlein (2004) derives nonparametric tests of negativity and symmetry in a random
utility setting which is more general than that of Lewbel (2001). Amongst other features, Hoderlein
(2004) considers a model that is more general than the additive model. The framework of Hoderlein
(2004) nests the framework of Lewbel (2001) and thus also nests our model. But none of these papers
contain any empirical applications. Brown and Matzkin (1998) construct a random utility model by
letting a random component enter the direct utility function and then derive the demand equations
from the utility maximisation problem. Their paper contains no empirical application. Beckert (2005)
estimates the demand for internet services, allowing for preference heterogeneity in a Cobb-Douglas utility
framework. This model automatically generates a conditional mean demand which is integrable because
individual preferences are Cobb-Douglas preferences. Calvet and Comon (2003) estimate an Almost Ideal
Demand system with unobserved heterogeneity, but since they have cross sectional data, they are forced
to being very restrictive in their heterogeneity speciﬁcation; e.g. they can only identify a linear scheme
with one heterogeneity parameter per individual and one per good, whereas panel data allows at least
one heterogeneity parameter per individual per good. In our model, we furthermore allow heterogeneous
price and income responses.
The integrability conditions in Lewbel (2001) bear a strong resemblance to the conditions for inte-
grability of the unconditional average demand in Muellbauer (1975) and Mas-Colell (1985). The matrix
of covariances that appear in Lewbel (2001) is roughly speaking a conditional version of the matric of
covariances that appear in Mas-Colell’s work on aggregation. It is somewhat surprising that conditioning
on observables like income does not provide more structure.
It is worth pointing out that while this paper deals with the question of obtaining integrability at the
average level, while assuming integrability at the individual level prevails. A diﬀerent type of question
one could ask is "Can we obtain integrability - or just the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference - at the
average level without assuming integrability at the individual level, but instead by assumptions on the
distributions of individual behavior?". This is the question asked in a strand of the theoretical demand
aggregation literature by amongst others Hildenbrand (1994) and Grandmont (1992). The results of
5Hildenbrand and Grandmont have an important feature in common with the conditions in Brown and
Walker (1989) and Lewbel (2001). Namely that what is needed is what Hildenbrand and Grandmont
denote behavioral heterogeneity in preferences, which are distributional assumptions on consumers’ be-
havior, i.e. distributional assumptions on how consumers respond to changes in for example income. In
other words, they also require that unobservable heterogeneity is functionally dependent on prices and/or
incomes.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the integrability conditions and
discuss what they imply for the ways in which we can introduce preference heterogeneity into demand
systems in a way that is consistent with consumer theory. In Section 3 we formulate our theoretical model
and provide a theoretical discussion of the integrability conditions in the context of our model. Section
4 presents the econometric model to be estimated and Section 5 presents the data. Section 6 describes
the estimation method and Section 7 contains the results. In Section 8 we compare estimated demand
system elasticities and welfare eﬀects from our heterogeneous model to a model with no heterogeneity.
Section 9 concludes.
2 The Integrability Conditions in the Presence of Unobservable
Heterogeneity
In this section we present and discuss the theoretical conditions for integrability of a demand system with
unobservable heterogeneity developed in Lewbel (2001).
2.1 Demand Systems and Integrability: The Usual Way
In order to put the integrability conditions for a demand system with unobservable heterogeneity into
the right perspective, we ﬁrst consider the usual way of modelling demands in empirical demand analysis.
Usually, we specify an additive model: The demands are modelled as the sum of a function of observables
(like prices and income) and an error term. The function of observables is common for all households,
whereas the error term is household-speciﬁc and does not depend on observables. The error term then
capture, among other things, unobservable heterogeneity and is typically assumed to have conditional
mean zero. Let N denote the number of goods, let wh denote the vector of budget shares for household
h, let p =( p1,...,pN)0 denote the vector of prices for the N goods, let lnp denote the vector of log prices,
let xh denote total expenditure for household h, let zh denote a K-dimensional vector of observable
characteristics of household h (e.g. demographic characteristics) and let εh denote the error term speciﬁc
to household h. Then the usual additive model can be written
wh = G(lnp,lnxh,z h)+εh,
where
E [ε|lnp,lnx,z]=0 .
6The function G(·) is then estimated from data. There is a vast literature on the estimation of demand
systems, with both parametric and nonparametric speciﬁcations of G(·). One of the most well-known
examples of a parametric form of G(·) is the Almost Ideal Demand system (hereafter denoted the AID
system), introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) and since used in numerous applications. The
data used for demand system estimation is nowadays typically cross sectional household expenditure
survey data, but until a couple of decades ago, household-level data were not that common and demand
systems would be estimated from aggregate level data4. Regardless of whether data is aggregate level
data or individual-level cross sectional data, and regardless of whether G(·) is speciﬁed parametrically
or nonparametrically, the additive structure of the individual budget share function together with the
zero mean condition implicitly deﬁnes G(·) as the conditional mean budget share function. This means
that what is in fact being estimated is always an average (namely the conditional mean) budget share
function.
N o w ,i no r d e rt ob ea b l et ou s et h ee s t i m a t e dp r i c e-and income elasticities from this demand system
for welfare analysis, the estimated demand must be consistent with consumer theory, i.e. the conditional
mean demand must be integrable. In order to perform welfare analysis at the individual level, we
will also need that the behavior of each individual is consistent with consumer theory, i.e. that the
individual demands G+ε are integrable. Traditionally, empirical demand analysis conducts integrability
analysis on G without taking the unobservable heterogeneity ε into account5.H o w e v e r ,i fo n ew a n t st o
explicitly interpret unobservable heterogeneity as containing preference heterogeneity, it seems natural
to also require that individual demands are integrable. The ﬁrst question that comes to mind is then
whether it is possible that individual demands, G + ε, as well as the estimated demand, namely the
conditional mean demand G, are integrable in the usual additive model? The answer to this question is
no (Brown and Walker (1989)): If G as well as G+ε are integrable, ε must be functionally dependent on
prices and/or incomes (i.e. the additive error terms must be heteroskedastic)6. As a consequence of this
result the literature on demand systems therefore turned to formulating demand systems that allow for
unobservable heterogeneity to be functionally dependent on prices and incomes. The natural way to do
this seems to be to adopt the random utility hypothesis as an approach for randomisation (e.g. Brown
and Matzkin (1998), Beckert (2002)).
2.2 Demand Systems and Integrability in the Presence of Unobservable Het-
erogeneity
Lewbel (2001) adopts the random utility approach to the additive demand system model allowing for
general heteroskedasticity of the error term and derive conditions under which the conditional mean
demand is integrable, given that individual demands are integrable. These conditions have testable
4The AID system was, when it was ﬁrst introduced in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980(b)), estimated on aggregate level
data.
5Quoting Brown and Walker (1989): As Barten (1977) remarks, "disturbances are usually tacked on to demand equations
as a kind of afterthought".
6With the exception of homothetic preferences. If wih = αih +εih,w h e r eE[εi]=αih − ¯ αi =0 , where ¯ αi is the mean of
the αih’s, then both the individual and the conditional mean demand is integrable (because they are both Cobb-Douglas).
However, there seems to be an overall consensus in the literature on demand systems that homothetic preferences are too
restrictive to realistically describe consumer behavior.
7implications for panel data which is what we utilize in this paper. In order to formulate Lewbel’s
conditions, consider a sample of H households, h =1 ,....,H. Throughout, we assume independence across
households. Let N, w, lnp, lnx and z be as before. Let η denote an L-dimensional vector of unobservable
characteristics with L ≥ N7.L e tg denote the individual budget share function of household h,a n dl e t
F(η |lnx,lnp, z) denote the conditional distribution of the unobserved characteristics in the population,
conditional on observable characteristics. We can then write individual budget shares as
w = g(lnp,lnx,z,η)
= G(lnp,lnx,z)+ν(lnp,lnx,z,η), (1)





The deﬁnition of G then implies that
E [ν |lnp,lnx,z]=0 .
Notice that this formulation of g in itself imposes no restrictions on individual budget shares: We can
choose g to be any budget share function, calculate G from (2) and then construct ν(·) as the residual
g − G. Obviously, this formulation nests the usual model.
Before turning to the integrability conditions, let us comment on how unobservable heterogeneity
enters in this framework as compared to how it enters in the usual model. In the usual model, preference
heterogeneity is implicitly a s s u m e dt ob ec a p t u r e di nt h eε’s. Since ε is functionally independent of
observables, price - and income eﬀects are restricted to have the same functional form for all households:
When diﬀerentiating the budget share function with respect to prices or income, there is no contribution
from ε. This means that preference heterogeneity can only enter as level eﬀects in the usual model.
In other words, the usual model does not allow for unobservable heterogeneity in the marginal eﬀects.
The formulation in (1) has the household-speciﬁc error term as a function of both unobservables and
observables (as was shown is necessary for integrability by Brown and Walker (1989)). This means that
preference heterogeneity enters not just as level eﬀects as in the usual model, but also as slope eﬀects.
For example, two households with identical income levels and identical observable characteristics can
have diﬀerent responses to a change in income. In other words, the result of Brown and Walker (1989)
means that in order to ensure integrability both at the individual level of the conditional mean in models
that allow for preference heterogeneity, it is necessary that preference heterogeneity enters not just as
7In order to ensure that the model produces a non-degenerate distribution of budget shares, it is necessary that there
are at least as many unobservables per individual as there are goods (Beckert (2006)).
8level eﬀects (i.e. that some households persistently have a high budget share for some good and others
a low budget share independently of prices and income levels), but also in the marginal eﬀects (i.e. that
diﬀerent households respond diﬀerently to changes in prices or in their incomes, all other things being
equal).
The error term being functionally independent on prices and/or incomes, however, only provides
necessary conditions for integrability of the conditional mean demand. Suﬃcient conditions are provided







˜ s(lnp,lnx,z)=s(lnp,lnx,z)+g(lnp,lnx,z)g(lnp,lnx,z)0 − diagg(lnp,lnx,z).
These are the budget share analogs to the Slutsky matrix. From classical demand theory we know that
the four conditions that ensure integrability of a continuously diﬀerentiable budget share function are:
Adding up (budget shares add up to one), homogeneity (the budget share function is homogeneus of
degree zero in prices and income), symmetry (that s is symmetric8) and negativity (that ˜ s is negative
semideﬁnite). The corresponding budget share analogs to the Slutsky matrix for the conditional mean







˜ S(lnp,lnx,z)=S(lnp,lnx,z)+G(lnp,lnx,z)G(lnp,lnx,z)0 − diagG(lnp,lnx,z).
We assume that individual demands are integrable. In addition, the following independence assumption
is invoked:
Fη ≡ F(η|lnx,lnp,z)=F(η|z), (3)
which, roughly speaking, states that preferences are stochastically independent of prices and income.
Under this independence assumption, ˜ S can be written
˜ S = E [˜ s] − M − Var [g], (4)
where









and where Var[g] is the variance-covriance matrix of g.F o r G to be integrable, G must satisfy adding
up, homogeneity, symmetry and negativity. Adding up follows directly because adding up is satisﬁed
at the individual level, and homogeneity follows from homogeneity at the individual level in conjunction
with the independence assumption. Since a variance-covariance matrix is always symmetric and positive
8Note that ˜ s is symmetric if and only if s is symmetric.
9deﬁnite, the negative of the variance matrix −Var[g] is also symmetric and negative deﬁnite. E [˜ s] is
symmetric and negative semideﬁnite because ˜ s is symmetric and negative semideﬁnite, which follows
from integrability at the individual level. Therefore ˜ S is symmetric if and only M is symmetric, and ˜ S
is negative semideﬁnite if M is positive semideﬁnite. Note that the integrability conditions are suﬃcient
conditions: Symmetry of M is necessary and suﬃcient, whereas the positive semideﬁniteness of M is only
suﬃcient.
2.2.1 The Matrix of Covariances
M is a matrix of covariances (not a variance-covariance matrix!). It expresses, roughly speaking, how
income eﬀects (i.e. marginal propensities to consume) vary with budget shares in response to changes
in unobservables. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) interpret the positive semideﬁniteness of M
as consumers with higher than average consumption of one commodity also tend to spend a higher than
average fraction of their last unit of income on that commodity. The expression for the Slutsky matrix
of the conditional mean demand, ˜ S, in (4) displays clearly how M comes about: The Slutsky matrix
for the conditional mean demand is not equal to the conditional average of the Slutsky matrices for the
individual demands. There is "something" left over, and this "something" is precisely the matrix of
covariances M. Integrability at the individual level ensures that E[˜ s]−Var[g] is well-behaved (negative
semideﬁnite), but imposes no structure whatsoever on M. This is very similar to the results found in the
studies of demand aggregation. Here the averageing of demands is unconditional and thus aggregation
happens over consumers with diﬀerent incomes. But the same matrix of covariances (only now the
covariances are unconditional) occurs in the special case where the income distribution is ﬁxed (see the
aggregation chapter in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)) and also in the case of more general
income distributions (see Mas-Colell (1985)). As Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) remark “the
source of the aggregation problem rests squarely with the wealth eﬀects on the consumption side”. The
result of Lewbel (2001) shows us that conditioning on income does not aid in getting rid of this problem
caused by the income eﬀects.
2.2.2 The Distribution of Unobservable Heterogeneity
There are two obvious cases in which the integrability conditions are met. One is the case where M is
the zero matrix. This case is for example implied by Gorman aggregation: If all consumers have identical
income eﬀects for each commodity, then each element of M is the covariance between a constant and a
random variable, which is always zero. Another case is where M i ss oc l o s et ob e i n gt h ez e r om a t r i xt h a t
the negative semideﬁniteness of E[˜ s]−Var[g] is large enough to make ˜ S negative semideﬁnite. This case
can be interpreted as budget shares and income eﬀects varying very little with unobservables, i.e. that
there is only little dispersion in preferences across consumers.
The integrability result presupposes that the distribution of unobservables conditional on observable
demographics are independent of prices and incomes ((3)). This assumption has recently been examined
empirically: Calvet and Comon (200?), Labeaga and Puig (2003), Browning and Collado (2006) and
Christensen (200?) all contain empirical evidence suggesting that this assumption may not hold in the
10data for all commodities. Calvet and Comon (2003) use the FES. The FES is a cross sectional data
set and hence the authors are forced to rely on a restictive identiﬁcaiton scheme (they assume that
preference heterogeneity can be described by one random parameter per good and one random parameter
per individual) which may account for their strong ﬁnding; they ﬁnd that the majority of the observed
variation in budget shares is due to preference heterogeneity and hence that income eﬀects can only
explain very little of the observed diﬀerences in budget shares. Labeaga and Puig (2003), Browning and
Collado (2006) and Christensen (2005) all use panel data (the same panel data set, namely the ECPF)
and hence they can allow for more ﬂexible speciﬁcations of unobservable heterogeneity than Calvet and
Comon. Diﬀering models and tests are employed in the three papers, but the ﬁndings are in concordance
with each other, namely that for some, but not all, goods, there is evidence of correlated heterogeneity.
When employing a similar test for the data set used in this paper we ﬁnd no or very little evidence against
the independence assumption.
3 How to Formulate Preference Heterogeneity and the Research
Question
To estimate the matrix of covariances M,w em u s tﬁrst specify the individual budget share function
g and the distribution of preference heterogeneity F. g can be speciﬁed either parametrically or non-
parametrically. We choose a parametric speciﬁcation, because this allows us to model the unobservable
household-speciﬁc characteristics η by the unknown parameters of the individual budget share functions,
which fascilitates identiﬁcation. More precisely, we model the preference heterogeneity by taking g to be
a parametric demand system and allowing all the intercept and slope parameters to be diﬀerent across
households. This amounts to specifying g as a variable-coeﬃcient model and accordingly view the coeﬃ-
cients as random variables with a conditional distribution, conditional on observables 9. This conditional
distribution of the coeﬃcients is then the distribution of preference heterogeneity. For example, if we
took g to have the most simple Working-Leser form, that is, g(lnx)=α + β lnx ,w ew o u l dv i e wα and
β as random variables with a conditional distribution across households such that each household h had
its own intercept αh a n di t so w ns l o p eβh.T h ev a l u e sαh and βh would be known to household h, but
unknown to the econometrician. In estimation, we can choose at one extreme to specify the distribution
of coeﬃcients completely nonparametrically, placing no restrictions on its form. In this case, we would
estimate the distribution of coeﬃcients as the empirical distribution of the estimated realizations of the
random variable underlying the distribution of coeﬃcients. Or, in other words, we would estimate each
coeﬃcient for each household. This approach is very general. The cost of this generality is that it involves
estimating a large number of parameters; in the example above with g having the Working-Leser form,
w ew o u l dh a v et oe s t i m a t eo n eα and one β for each household. At the other extreme, we can choose to
model the distribution of coeﬃcients completely parametrically, for example by a normal distribution; in
the example with g having the Working-Leser form, this would involve estimating only ﬁve parameters:
The mean and variance of α, the mean and variance of β and the covariance of α with β.I nb e t w e e nt h e
9We will refer to the parameters both as "coeﬃcients" and as "parameters".
11two extremes lies a whole range of (semi-parametric) possibilities, like for example assuming a mixture
distribution for the coeﬃcients a la Heckman and Singer (1984).
We choose the nonparametric extreme and thus place no restrictions on the distribution of coeﬃ-
cients. The reason for choosing the fully nonparametric approach to the modelling of the distribution
of preference heterogeneity is that any restriction on this distribution would be completely ad hoc; this
type of model has never been estimated on demand panel data for a complete set of goods before, and so
there are no suggestions in the literature about what is reasonable to assume about the distribution of
preference heterogeneity. Moreover, as we will show later in Section 3.4, distributional assumptions can
actually imply that the matrix of covariances is symmetric and positive semideﬁnite. In other words, by
imposing distributional assumptions, we risk imposing integrability of the conditional mean demand by
assumption. Obviously, this would be highly undesirable. As mentioned earlier, the drawback of the fully
nonparametric approach is that it involves a large number of parameters to be estimated, and therefore
we will expect less precise estimates from this approach than from a parametric or a semiparametric
approach.
Obviously, this ﬂexible speciﬁcaiton of preference heterogeneity is only feasible because our panel data
set has large T. Our approach is similar to the idea underlying the mean-group estimator in Pesaran
and Smith (1995): Like them, we also estimate a set of individual-speciﬁc paraemters for each household
(each group), but where Pesaran and Smith (1995) are interested in the average regression coeﬃcient, we
are interested in a diﬀerent function of the estimated coeﬃcients, namely in the matrix of covariances of
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀects with the budget shares, M.
In Section 3.1 we specify g and F, in Section 3.2 we calculate the conditional mean demand for our
model, and in Section 3.3 we calculate the object of interest for the integrability test, the matrix of
covariances M, for our model. Then we are ﬁnally able to state the research question in precise terms. In
Section 3.4 we go beyond the model and give some examples of model speciﬁcations that in themselves
lead to M being symmetric and positive semideﬁnite. Note that all that follows depend on the choice of
g and F, since the matrix of covariances M is speciﬁct ot h e s ec h o i c e s .
3.1 Individual Demands: An Almost Ideal Demand System with Household-
Speciﬁc Parameters and a Nonparametric Distribution of Parameters
We choose g to be an AID system and introduce randomness in demands by making the intercept and
slope parameters household-speciﬁc. Then the budget share equations for the N goods for household h
are given by
wih = αih + βih [lnx − lnPh(p)] +
P
j γij lnpj,i =1 ,...,N, (5)
where Ph(p) is the price index given by10
lnPh(p)=
P





10Since the intercept parameter, usually denoted α0, in the price index is not identiﬁed we omit it wthout any loss of
generality.
12Since we assume that the demand of each individual is generated from utility maximisation, we have the
usual restrictions on the parameters of an AID system, but now for α and β, they must hold for each h
11:
Pn
i=1 αih =1 ,
Pn
i=1 βih =0 ,
Pn
i=1 γij =0for all j (6)
Pn
j=1 γij =0 for all i (7)
γij = γji for all i,j. (8)
Let θ denote the vector of random parameters in the demand system, i.e. θ =( α,β)0. The conditional
distribution of preference heterogeneity is the conditional distribution of the unknown parameters θ,
conditional on log total expenditure, log prices and demographics. Denote it by Fθ ≡ F(α,β |lnx,lnp,z).
The independence assumption (3) translates thus into that θ is conditionally independent of lnx and of
lnp for all i,j, conditional on demographics z.
3.2 The Conditional Mean Demand
The conditional mean demand for commodity i is calculated from (2) as
Z
gi(lnx,lnp;θ)dF = Gi(lnx,lnp).
The conditional mean budget share function Gi for commodity i is thus given as the conditional mean
of the indvidual budget shares (5) with respect to the joint distribution of the α and β, conditional on
lnx, lnp and z. Let µαi and µβi denote the conditional means in the marginal distributions of αi and
βi,i=1 ,...,N, and write the parametric price index as lnP(p;α) to remind ourselves that it depends α
which is a vector of random parameter then using the independence assumption, we get from (5) that




j γij lnpj (9)











l γkl lnpk lnpl +
P
j γij lnpj,i =1 ,....,N.
Note that G in itself is not an AID system because of the terms
R
(βiαk)dF stemming from the
parametric price index. I fi tw a sn o tf o rt h i st e r m ,G would be an AID system with parameters given by
the conditional mean of the corresponding parameters of the individual AID systems. But because β is
not necessarily independent of α, the mean of the product of βi with αk is not necessarily equal to the
product of the mean of βi a n dt h em e a no fαk, and so G is not an AID system. From this observation it
is clear that this must be a general point: When introducing unobservable heterogeneity in preferences
by letting the parameters of a parametric demand system vary across individuals, the conditional mean
demand will not have the generic form of the individual demands if the individual demands are nonlinear
11See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) section 3.4 or Christensen (2005) Chapter 4 Appendix A.
13in the parameters (i.e. are nonlinear in the unobservable preference heterogeneity). From this statement
it is now clear that a suﬃcient condition for the conditional mean demand to be an AID system is that
βi is conditionally independent of αk,k=1 ,...,N, for all i =1 ,....,N :
Example 1 Independent income eﬀects
Assume that the income eﬀect for commodity i, βi, is independent of all the intercept parameters in
the system for every commodity i =1 ,....,N. Then the conditional mean demand G is itself an AID
system:





and since βi is independent of α,














l γkl lnpk lnpl +
P
j γij lnpj












j γij lnpj,i =1 ,....,N.
Thus, G is an AID system with parameters given as the conditional means of the corresponding individual
parameters.
3.3 The Matrix of Covariances and the Research Question
The (i,j)’th entry in the matrix of covariances, M, is the covariance between the partial derivative of
the budget share function for commodity i with respect to lnx and the budget share for commodity j
across households. Since in our model the partial derivative of the budget share function for household
h for commodity i with respect to log total expenditure is βih,h=1 ,...,H, the (i,j)’th entry of M
for our model is given by, where we use the independence assumption of parameters being conditionally
independent of prices and total expenditures
Mij = Cov[βi,g j(lnp,lnx,z;θ)|z]








k βjαk lnpk |z
¤
, (10)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a tt h ec o v a r i a n c eo far a n d o mv a r i a b l ew i t hac o n s t a n ti sz e r o .
Now we are ﬁnally able to state the research question in precise terms. We have formulated a demand
system with unobservable heterogeneity which is nested within the framework of Lewbel (2001). The
integrability conditions in Lewbel (2001) then yield that the conditional mean demand for this demand
system is integrable if the matrix of covariances M is symmetric and positive semideﬁnite. Our model is
an AID system in which each household has its own intercept parameter and its own slope parameter.
14The research question is thus whether a set of AID systems with all intercept and slope parameters being
household-speciﬁc generates an integrable conditional mean demand. Taking a closer look at M,w es e e
that without further assumptions, M is not necessarily symmetric. A suﬃcient condition for symmetry





symmetric without further assumptions. Thus, G is not necessarily integrable.
3.4 Alternative assumptions on the distribution of preference heterogeneity
As mentioned earlier, making assumptions on the distribution of preference heterogenity can have the
unfortunate consequence that it makes M symmetric. In this section we give two examples of such
assumptions:
Example 2 Identical income eﬀect coeﬃcients in the AID system
Let the budget share equations for household h be given by
gi(lnp,lnx;θ)=αih + βi lnx − βi lnPh(p)+
P
j γij lnpj,i =1 ,...,N,
for each h =1 ,...,H. Then the partial derivative of the budget share function for commodity i with
respect to log total expenditure is βi for all households. Since Mij is the covariance of the income eﬀect
for commodity i with the budget share of commodity j across households, and since the income eﬀect is
the same for all households, Mij is the covariance between a constant and a random variable, so Mij is
zero for all i,j. This trivially implies that M is both symmetric and positive semideﬁnite.
This example shows that identical income eﬀects for all households for all commodities in the AID
system implies that the matrix of covariances is symmetric and positive semideﬁnite, i.e. identical income
eﬀects imply that G is integrable. This resembles the case of Gorman aggregation, where identical income
eﬀects (parallel individual Engel curves) implies that average demand (even unconditionally) is integrable.
Example 3 Income eﬀects independent of the other parameters of the demand system
Suppose that βi is conditionally independent of αj,j=1 ,...,N, conditional on lnx, lnp and z for all
i, and consider again Mij. This independence assumption, together with all parameters being independent























































i.e. M is symmetric. Furthermore, M is the product of the conditional variance-covariance matrix




. The conditional variance-
covariance matrix is positive deﬁnite which implies that M is positive semideﬁnite if lnx −
R
lnP(p;α)
is greater than or equal to zero.P (p;α) is a price index and thus it lies between 0 and 1,h e n c elnP(p;α)
is less than or equal to zero, hence the mean of lnP(p;α) is also less than or equal to zero, which implies
that lnx −
R
lnP(p;α) is greater than zero for all values of total expenditure greater than 1. Since total
e x p e n d i t u r ei sa l w a y sm u c hl a r g e rt h a n1 ,M is also positive semideﬁnite.
Note that these examples are speciﬁc to this particular model where g is an AID system. If chosing
ad i ﬀerent parametric form of g, one would have to re-examine which additional assumptions on the
distribution of preference heterogeneity have unfortunate consequences for that choice of g12. We chose
the AID system as our basic functional form, because the AID system is one of the most used parametric
demand systems in the literature and because the income eﬀects in that model are simply the β’s which
simpliﬁes estimations and interpretations.
The second example shows that if we were to chose a distributional form of the preference parameters,
we need to allow for a general covariance-structure in that distribution (i.e. that we need to allow at
least for the income eﬀects to correlate with other parameters). Finding such a distribution would not be
a big problem. However, a more complicated issue, which is independent of the choice of g, is to ﬁnd a
distribution from which the coeﬃcients could be randomly drawn and yet always yield integrability at the
individual level. It is not at all clear which distribution would ensure this. All these examples highlight
the motivation for the chosen modelling strategy of not imposing any structure on the distribution of
preference heterogeneity instead of imposing a random utility model across households.
12If for example chosing g is the QUAID system, identical income eﬀe c t sd on o ti m p l ys y m m e t r yo fM, see Lewbel(2001).
164 The Econometric Model
We model individual demand as an AID system with intercept and slope parameters being household-
speciﬁc. The budget share equations for a given household h are thus given by
wiht = αih + βih [lnxht − lnPht(p)] +
PN
j=1 γij lnpjt +
PK
k=1 δikzkht + εiht, (11)
i =1 ,...,N, t =1 ,...,T, with the price index given by
lnPht =
PN





for t =1 ,...,T, and where zht is a K-dimensional vector of demographics for household h at time t and
εiht is the idiosyncratic error term for household h,c o m m o d i t yi at time t. Note that αi and βi vary
across households for all commodities, whereas the price coeﬃcients γij and the demographic coeﬃcients
δik are restricted to being identical across households. We impose integrability at the individual level by
imposing adding up, homogeneity and symmetry at the individual parameters. Adding up is satisﬁed by
leaving out one commodity. We leave out the N’th commodity and thus end up with a system of N − 1
equations. Homogeneity is imposed by using relative prices, relative to the left out commodity, i.e. we
use the relative log prices ln e pjt =l n pjt − lnpNt,j =1 ,...,N − 1. Symmetry is imposed by imposing
γij = γji for all i,j =1 ,...,N −1 in estimation. The error term structure of the demand system is given
by E [εiht]=0for all i,t, E [εihtεjhs]=σ2
ij for all i,j, t = s and E [εihtεjhs]=0for all i,j, t 6= s.
As a benchmark case we will be using an AID system with no heterogeneity, i.e.
wiht = αih + βi [lnxht − lnPt(p)] +
PN
j=1 γij lnpjt +
PK
k=1 δikzkht + εiht, (12)
i =1 ,...,N, t =1 ,...,T, with the price index given by
lnPht =
PN





where integrability is now imposed on the homogenenous parameters. When we compare the two models
(11) and (12), we will refer to (11) as the heterogeneous model and to (12) as the homogeneous, or pooled,
model.
5D a t a
The data we use is a unique Spanish panel data sets on household expenditures, the Spanish Permanent
Survey of Consumption (Encuesta Permanente de Consumo, hereafter the ECP), collected by the Spanish
National Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica). It is a real panel of sizeable longitudinal
length: the ECP covers the years 1978-83 with quarterly information on all recorded variables with
households staying in the survey between 6 and 24 quarters. All households in the data set are headed
by a married couple and may contain children or other adults cohabiting in the household. The data set
17contains information on consumption expenditures for a wide range of commodity groups, price indices for
these commodities as well as a variety of demographic variables such as labour market status, occupation,
education level of the husband, the ages of the diﬀerent household members and housing tenure. The
version of the ECP we have available consists of 1641 households with more than 70 percent staying in
the sample for at least 9 consecutive quarters. The total number of observations is 21.668. For complete
lists of the variables recorded in the ECP, see Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix A.
This Spanish household expenditure data set is exceptional in that it is a real panel with detailed
information on a full range of commodities and prices, as well as on demographics. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the longest real panels on household consumption expenditures covering a wide range
of commodity groups, we have available. For comparison, the British Family Expenditure Survey (the
FES) is a cross sectional data set and so does not provide the same possibility of taking account of
unobservable heterogeneity. The American Consumer Expenditure Survey (the CEX) contains a rotating
panel with information on several commodity groups, but it only has information on 4 quarters per
household. Moreover, the consumption information in the panel part of the CEX consists of recall data
only, and rescent research shows that the best method for collecting accurate consumption expenditure
data is a combination of diary and recall information, see Battistin (2003). In contrast, the Spanish
data consists of a combination of diary and recall information with a grouping of commodities into which
are recorded as diary information and which are recorded as recall information very close to the one
recommended in Battistin (2003). The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (the PSID) is also a real panel
and is of considerable length, but it only contains consumption expenditure information on food (food in
and food out) and is therefore not well suited for analyzing demand choices. The British Household Panel
Survey (the BHPS) is another real panel, but also this panel has insuﬃcient information on consumption
expenditures: The BHPS only records expenditures on household appliances and electronics and has
one food question which asks how much the household approximately spends on food and groceries each
week 13. The European Community Household Panel Survey (the ECHP) has no records on consumption
expenditures 14. Finally, there exists a panel survey for Japan (The Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers,
the JPSC) which contains consumption information. However, the JPSC asks all households about
expenses only for the calendar month of September 15, which makes it impossible to control for seasonal
variation in demands.
In this paper, we use a subsample of the ECP. We select a sample consisting of the households that
are observed for all 24 quarters in order to have as many observations per household as possible. In
this sample, some households either experience changes to the husband’s labor market status in form
of unemployment spells or retirement, or the husband is retired in all 24 quarters16.T h i s c o u l d b e
questionable because separability between the consumption of goods and labor supply is an underlying
assumption of demand theory, and there seems to be some empirical evidence against it (e.g. Browning
13Browning, Crossley and Weber (2003) p. F563.
14The ECHP asks the household questions like "can you aﬀord" various expenses, see Browning, Crossley and Weber
(2003) p. F563, but this type of information is not useful for estimating demand systems.
15Browning, Crossley and Weber (2003) p. F563.
16The data contains no information about the wife’s labor market status, but given the sample period - 1978-83 - it is
likely that most of the wives are housewives. See also Christensen (2005).
18and Meghir (1992)). But ﬁrstly, we need as large a sample with as much variation in total expenditures
as we can get17. Secondly, the rejections of separability are much stronger for women than for men, and
we only consider the labor supply of men. Thirdly, as can be seen form the table below, almost 70 percent
of the husbands are employed throughout the survey period, and 22 percent are retired throughout or
retires during the survey period. And since Christensen (2005) ﬁnds no rejections of separability between
consumption and retirement in another representative Spanish panel data set (the ECPF) covering the
years 1985-97, we are left with that only 10 percent of the sample experiences changes to their labor
supply and hence 10 percent for which separability could be an issue. In the light of this, the sample
selection does not seem too troublesome.
Labor market status Number of households Percent
Employed for all 24 quarters 168 67.50
Retired for all 24 quarters 31 12.42
Retires during the 24 quarters 25 10.04
Experiences spells of unemployment 25 10.04
Total 249 100.0
To get an idea of whether there could be selection problems stemming from selecting only the house-
holds that stay in the survey for the whole of the survey period, we compare the selected sample to the
full data set. Summary statistics are presented in Table A.3 - A.5 in Appendix A. As can be seen, the
characteristics of the households in our selected sample do not diﬀer in any remarkable way from the
full data set: The husbands’ education levels are sligtly lower, there is a slightly higher percentage og
houseowners and the households spend on average less on every commodity group than in the full data
set. None of the ﬁgures raise any concerns of sample selection problems, selected on observables.
To keep the integrability test as simple as possible, we construct four composite commodity groups
from the 12 of the 14 commodities, leaving out Rent and Durables. The deﬁnition of the four commodity
groups, together with their mean and standard deviations, are displayed in the table below.






+ Foodout + Alcohol & tobacco
.60 .16
Clothing Clothing .10 .07
Utilities
Energy + Services + Medication
+ Transportation + Other
.24 .13
Leisure activities Leisure + Holidays .06 .07
The commodity group Food, Alcohol and Tobacco constitues a larger percentage of the total budget
17Christensen (2007) carries out the integrability test on the sample in which all husbands are employed in a permanent
job throughout the survey period. This sample, however, turns out to be too homogeneous for the test to have any power.
19than is usually the case for food. It is abnormally large because the budget share for Food at home is
abnormally large; an average budget share for Food of around 30% is what is usually observed in other
expenditure surveys. The reason for this is that Spain went through a recession during the years where
the ECP was collected 18.
We construct the log prices for each of the composite commodity groups as the weighted average
of the log prices for the goods in that particular commodity group, with the weights being the average
budget share for the goods. When estimating the demand system, the left out good will be Utilities, and
therefore the relative prices are the prices of Food, Alcohol&Tobacco, Clothing and Leisure&Holidays
relative to the price of Utilities. The variation over the sample period in relative prices is shown in Figure
1 in Appendix A. As the graph shows there is independent variation between the three relative prices
which means there is hope of some, or all, of the price coeﬀcients being well identiﬁed.
We will estimate the matrix of covariances by a two-step procedure where we in the ﬁrst step estimate
the parameters of the demand system from the within variation in the data, and in the second step
estimate the matrix of covariances from the between variation in the data. To get an idea of theamount
of within and between variation in the data, we estimate a measure for each of the two sources of
variations. A linear random eﬀects estimation shows the fraction of variance in the error term which is
due to the individual-speciﬁc part, which is a measure of the within-variation in the data. As can be seen
form the table below, this fraction is between 25 and 50 percentof the total variation in the data, which
seems high:
Commodity Food, Alcohol and Tobacco Clothing Leisure and Holidays Utilities
Within variation .4331 .2597 .2869 .4423
By regressing each of the budget shares on the set of household dummies, we can use the R2sf r o m









Between variation .5389 .2526 .3324 .5104
Again, this fraction is between 25 and 50 percent of the total variation in budget shares, and we
thus conclude that there seems to be suﬃcient variation in the data in both the within and the between
dimension.
6 Estimation Procedure
The estimation of M is carried out in two steps. Recall that entry (i,j) in M is the covariance of the
budget share for commodity i w i t ht h ei n c o m ee ﬀect for commodity j.I n t h e ﬁrst step, we estimate
the demand system and get out the income eﬀects and the predicted budget shares for each of the
commodities. In the second step we calculate the covariance of the budget share for commodity i with
the income eﬀect for commodity j as the sample covariance across households of the estimated budget
18M. D. Collado (1998).
20share for commodity i with the estimated income eﬀect for commodity j.
6.1 Step 1: Estimation of the Demand System
We estimate the heterogeneous AID system in (11) on the sample of 249 households, allowing the intercept
(the constant term) and the slope parameter (the income coeﬃcient) to vary across households for each
good. The left out good is Utilities, so the three composite goods are "Food, Alcohol & Tobacco",
"Clothing" and "Leisure & Holidays". We control for seasonality with quarterly dummies, for the number
of members in the household with the household size and for the husband’s labor market status with a
dummy for whether the husband is employed. Restricting the price coeﬃcients, the coeﬃcients on the
quarterly dummies, the coeﬃcients on household size and the coeﬃcients on the employment dummy
to being identical across households for each good introduces restrictions on the budget share equations
across household for each good. Imposing symmetry at the individual level further introduces cross
equation restrictions on the budget share equations across goods. Hence we need to estimate the AID
system as one large system for all three goods and for all households simultaneously. We stack the
budget shares for the three goods in one long vector on the left hand side and stack intercepts, log
total expenditures, prices, quarterly dummies, household size and employment dummies according to the
restrictions of identical coeﬃcients and symmetry as discussed before, on the right hand side. Since we for
each of the three goods have 249 households, each observed for 24 quarters, the system has 3·249·24 = 17
928 equations. Since intercepts and slopes vary across households, there are 3 · 249 + 3 · 249 = 1494
household speciﬁc parameters to be estimated. Because of symmetry there are six price parameters to
be estimated. And since there are three quarterly dummies and one household size variable and one
employment dummy for each good, there are ﬁfteen demographic parameterst ob ee s t i m a t e d .T h u s ,w e
have a total of 1515 parameters to be estimated from 17 928 observations.
The AID system is nonlinear in parameters, because the price index contains parameters. If there
were no parameters to be estimated in the price index, the system would be linear in parameters. The
usual way of estimating the AID is an iterative procedure which exploits this: In an initial step, the
parametric price index is replaced by the Stone price index and the resulting linear model is estimated
by least squares. The parameter estimates of this initial step are then used to calculate the parametric
price index, which is then inserted in place of the Stone price index. A new set of parameters is estimated
and the parametric price index is recalculated. This iterative procedure is continued until the parameter
estimates converge (converge in the sense that they do not change from iteration to iteration). We
estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters using the least squares residuals from the ﬁnal
iteration.
As a benchmark case, we also estimate the corresponding homogeneous model (12) on the same sample,
i.e. we estimate an AID system with all parameters being identical across households. This system has 27
parameters to be estimated from the same 17 928 observations. Estimation of the parameters is carried
out by the iterative procedure described above, and standard errors are calculated using the least squares
residuals from the ﬁnal iteration, as above.
216.2 Step 2: Estimation of the matrix of covariances
The ﬁgures needed for estimating the matrix of covariances are the estimated income eﬀects and the
predicted budget shares for each of the three commodities for each of the 249 households. The estimated
income eﬀects are simply the estimates of the coeﬃcients on log total expenditure, b βih,i =1 ,2,3,h =
1,...,249. For the predicted budget share for good j, household h, we use the the average over time of the
predicted budget shares for good j for household h, i.e. ˆ wih = T−1 PT
t=1 ˆ wiht,i =1 ,2,3,h=1 ,...,249.
The covariances of income eﬀects with budget shares can now be calculated as the sample covariances
across households of the estimated income eﬀects with the estimated budget shares. Entry (i,j) of M is
thus calculated as
ˆ Mij = H−1 PH









We bootstrap the standard erroros of ˆ M. We chose the bootstrap over the delta-method, since the
latter often gives (more) biased results. We do a non-parametric bootstrap and sample from the data.
We sample in clusters, that is, we sample households and for each sampled household, we sample all three
budget shares. By sampling households we maintain the (true) covariance between time periods within
a household. By sampling all three budget shares we ensure that the adding up restriction on budget
shares holds in each bootstrap sample. We draw B =1 0 .000 bootstrap samples, estimate the household
speciﬁc AID system and M for each bootstrap sample, and then calculate the variance-covariance matrix
of the vectorized matrix of ˆ M as the sample covariance of the boostrap samples. To take an example,
then the (2,3)’th element in the estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of ˆ M is calculated as



















In this section we present the integrability test. We also present and discuss the household-speciﬁc
demand system estimates resulting from the ﬁrst stage estimation. Since the integrability test depends
on these household-speciﬁc estimates - and since these are interesting in their own right - we start with
them.
7.1 Results from the Estimation of the Heterogeneous Model
The output from the ﬁrst stage estimation of the household speciﬁc AID system is 249 sets of intercept
and slope estimates, one set for each household, together with six price coeﬃcient estimates and ﬁfteen
demographic eﬀects that are common across households. Firstly, we compare our estimation results with
the estimates from the benchmark case, i.e. with the estimates from the homogenenous AID system, to
get an idea of whether our individual-speciﬁc estimates are reasonable. To this end, note that the demand
for good i in the homogeneous AID system evaluated at unit prices (i.e. in the base year) is given by
˜ wi = e αi + e βi lnx, i =1 ,2,3,where e αi and e βi are the homogenenous intercept and slope parameters,
22and that the conditional mean demand for good i in the household-speciﬁc AID system, evaluated at
unit prices, is given by Gi(lnx)=µαi + µβi lnx,where µαi and µβi are the means of the corresponding
household-speciﬁc parameters αih and βih,h=1 ,....,H. This means that the Engel curve for good i
in the base year resulting from the estimation of the homogeneous AID system should be similar to the
"Engel curve" for good i i nt h eb a s ey e a rw i t hi n t e r c e p ta n ds l o p ec o e ﬃcients given by the mean of the
estimated household-speciﬁc intercepts and slopes. The estimates of the intercepts and slopes for the
homogeneous model as well as the means of the household-speciﬁc estimates of intercepts and slopes and
their standard errors are as follows (where (*) means the parameter is signiﬁcant):
Coeﬃcient Homogeneous AID Mean of household-speciﬁcA I D
Intercept coeﬃcient for good 1 (α1) 1.9263 (.002936)* 1.2777 (0.038336)*
Intercept coeﬃcient for good 2 (α2) .0856 (.002936)* -.0565 (0.033828)
Intercept coeﬃcient for good 3 (α3) -.4100 (.002938)* -.3512 (0.037611)*
Slope coeﬃcient for good 1 (β1) -.01104 (.002574)* -.0515 (.003253)*
Slope coeﬃcient for good 2 (β2) -.00015 (.002574) .0132 (.002888)*
Slope coeﬃcient for good 3 (β3) .0391 (.002575)* .0314 (.003199)*
The estimates are similar for goods 1 and 3; for good 3 the Engel curves even coincide completely. For
good 2 the point estimates suggest a diﬀerence, but as can be seen from the standard errors, then the
slope coeﬃcient in the homogeneous model is as the only parameter very imprecisely estimated and could
thus just as well be positive. The remaining parameter estimates are directly comparable since they
do not vary across households in the heterogeneous model. Below are the estimated price coeﬃcients
together with their standard errors (where (*) means the parameter is signiﬁcant)19:
Coeﬃcient Homogeneous AID Mean of household-speciﬁcA I D
Price coeﬃcient for good 1, price of good 1 (γ11) -.1864 (.06649)* -.0161 (.051443)
Price coeﬃcient for good 1, price of good 2 (γ12) .0107 (.02220) -.0030 (.01724)
Price coeﬃcient for good 1, price of good 3 (γ13) -.0051 (.06805) -.0633 (.05213)
Price coeﬃcient for good 2, price of good 2 (γ22) -.0300 (.01414)* -.0394 (.01177)*
Price coeﬃcient for good 2, price of good 3 (γ23) .0147 (.04129) -.0394 (.03150)
Price coeﬃcient for good 3, price of good 3 (γ33) .0481 (.15762) .1209 (.1205)
A sc a nb es e e nf r o mt h et a b l e ,o n l yt w oo ft h es i xp r i c ec o e ﬃcients are signiﬁcant in the homogeneous
model and only one is signiﬁcant in the heterogeneous model. This reﬂects a common ﬁnding, namely
that it is often diﬃcult to get signiﬁcant price eﬀects in demand system estimation.
Histograms of the parameter estimates are depicted in Appendix B. They show that all marginal
distributions are unimodal, and that some are skewed. The latter justiﬁes our choice of not modelling the
distribution of preference heterogeneity as a normal distribution since that would have imposed symmetry
of the marginal distributions. That the distributions are unimodal can be interpreted as there are no
19T h ee s t i m a t e so ft h ec o e ﬃcients on the demogrpahics are in Table ? in Appendix B
23distinct "types" in the data; if for example the distribution of β1 had had a bimodal distribution with
most of its support in two points, this could be interpreted as if most of the households had either one
β1 or the other, i.e. that there are two "types" in the population. This situation would lend itself to a
Heckman-Singer type approach (Heckman and Singer (1984)) in which the distribution of unobservables
is modelled as a a ﬁnite number of "types".
From the histograms it appears that there are quite large diﬀerences in the parameter estimates across
households, suggesting a considerable amount of unobservable heterogeneity in the data. We test whether
this is indeed the case by testing for identical income eﬀects across households and identical intercepts
across households, resepctively, by an asymptotic F-type-test. Both test statistics are asymptotically chi-
square with 3·(249−1) = 744 degrees of freedom. For the case of the intercepts, we get a test statistic of
F = 2319 and a p-value of 4.45·10−161, so we strongly reject intercepts being identical across households.
Similarly for the income eﬀects, we get a test statistic of F = 2378 and a p-value of 7.59·10−170,s ow e
also strongly reject income eﬀects being identical across households. The latter result means that if the
matrix of covariances M turns out to be symmetric, it is not because the income eﬀects are identical
across households (which would imply M symmetric, see Example 1).
As a visual illustration of the heterogenity in the data, we have picked a few households with the
distribution of total expenditures roughly covering the support of total expenditures and depicted their
Engel curves in Appendix B. Some households having upwards sloping Engel curves while other have
downwards sloping Engel curves for the same good, in stark contrast to the homogeneous model which
restricts the individual Engel curves for each good to exhibit identical slopes. This illustrates the sub-
stantial amount of heterogeneity already established by the tests above. Some Engel curves are steep,
suggesting that the household is very sensitive to changes in income when it comes to consumption of
thatgood, whereas others would hardly change their consumption of that good at all if their income
changed. Is there a systematic relationship between having a great liking for a good and how sensitive to
income changes one’s demand for that good is? This question is answered by considering the correlation
between intercepts and slopes. The table below shows the correlation between the estimates of α and β.
The interesting part is the correlation between αi’s and βi’s for the same good20: If a household has a
high intercept for a certain good, this means that the household will always use a high proportion of their
budget on that good, regardless of what their budget is. The correlation table shows that if this is the
case, then the household has a low income eﬀect for that good, since αi and βi are negatively correlated
for all goods. This is what we would have expected: That a high, ﬁxed taste for a good goes hand in
hand with not wanting to change one’s demand for that good in response to changes in one’s income.
20Obviously, the correlations between α’s and β’s with themselves are all negative, since the α’ ss u mt o1a n dβ’s sum to
0 by construction of the model.
24α1 α2 α3 β1 β2 β3
Intercept coeﬃcient for good 1 (α1) 1
Intercept coeﬃcient for good 2 (α2) -.38 1
Intercept coeﬃcient for good 3 (α3) -.31 -.04 1
Slope coeﬃcient for good 1 (β1) -.99 .38 .31 1
Slope coeﬃcient for good 2 (β2) .38 -.99 .04 -.38 1
Slope coeﬃcient for good 3 (β3) .32 .03 -.99 -.32 -.03 1
7.2 The Integrability Test
The estimate of the matrix of covariances M is21:
ˆ M =
⎡
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As can be seen immediately, several of the elements of ˆ M are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Below
we report the χ2-statistics of the nine individual tests of
H0 : Mij =0 ,i , j =1 ,..,3,
which are each asymptotically chi square distributed with one degree of freedom. As can be seen, the
three elements M11,M 13 and M33 are strongly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero:
Element in ˆ M ˆ M11 ˆ M21 ˆ M31 ˆ M12 ˆ M22 ˆ M32 ˆ M13 ˆ M23 ˆ M33
χ2-statistic 30.94 .028 .23.07 .46 .807 .306 1.42 .792 11.00
p-value 0 .867 0 .498 .369 .580 .233 .373 .001
Hence, M is not the zero matrix and is thus not trivially symmetric. For completeness, we report a joint
test of whether M is the zero matrix, since a joint test may have more power than the individual t type
tests. The null hypothesis for this test can be written
H0 : RM =0 ,









,which is asymptotically chi square with 9 degrees of freedom. We
get ˆ W0 = 104, which results in a p-value of 2 · 10−18, i.e. we strongly reject that M is the zero matrix.
We therefore test whether M is symmetric by testing whether the oﬀ-diagonal elements are diﬀerent from
21Row 1 is Food, Alcohol & Tobacco; row 2 is Clothing and row 3 is Leisure & Holidays. Bootstrapped standard errors
are in parentheses. All elements are multiplied by 1000.
25each other. The null hypothesis is:
H0 : Mij − Mji =0 ,i 6= j,
and these test statistics must again be evaluated in the chi square distribution with one degree of freedom:
Element M12 − M21 M13 − M31 M23 − M32
χ2-statistic .34 1.10 2.53
p-value .559 29.4 11.2
As can be seen, we do not reject symmetry. Furthermore, the non-rejection is quite strong, with
p-values between 11 and 56 percent. This means that this non-rejection occurs not because the estimate
of M is too imprecise to reject that M is a matrix of zeroes, but because it is a real non-rejection. We
therefore conclude that the conditional mean demand generated from a population of heterogeneous AID
systems is in fact integrable and hence is consistent with utility maximisation. This means that there
is some underlying utility function which generates the conditional mean demand. This in turn means
that performing welfare analysis based on the estimated conditional mean is justiﬁed. However, it is not
clear what this utility function looks like. From (9) in Section 3 we know what the conditional budget
share function looks like and we know that it is not an AID system, hence the utility function underlying
the conditional mean demand estimated from a population of heterogeneous AID systems is not the
Almost Ideal utility. We therefore conclude that we can not calculate welfare eﬀects directly based on
the conditional mean demand function. What we can do, however, is to calculate welfare eﬀects for
each consumer, since each consumer has an Almost Ideal indirect utility function, and then consider the
resulting distribution of welfare eﬀects, conditional on income. This is done in the context of an example
of a tax increase in the next section.
8 Comparing the Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Models
In this section we compare demand system estimates of price and income elasticities and welfare eﬀects
estimated from the heterogeneous model to those estimated from an AID model with no unobservable
heterogeneity. This is interesting because the model with heterogeneity is the model that would usually
be estimated from cross sectional data.
The value of having integrable demands is that it fascilitates welfare analysis. Suppose for example
that the government increases the tax on Alcohol & Tobacco; from the demand system estimates alone we
can assess quantitatively how demands will change following the tax increase, but in order to assess how
the welfare of the consumers change, we need a utility framework. Given that integrability is not rejected,
we know that the conditional mean demand is generated by utility maximisation of some utility function.
But as mentioned above, we do not know what this utility function looks like (and it is beyond the scope of
this paper to ﬁnd out). We therefore calculate the welfare eﬀects at the individual level for each household,
utilising that each household is maximising an Almost Ideal utility function. We consider a tax increase
26that leads to the price of Food, Alcohol & Tobacco to increase by 20% and estimate the compensating
variations for each household, using that household’s particular utility function, conditional on income.
We consider ﬁve percentiles in the income distribution, and hence the estimation in the heterogeneous
model results in ﬁve conditional distributions each of 249 compensating variations. The homogeneous
model assumes that all households have the same preferences, and hence this model produces only one
compensating variation for each income percentile. We compare this one compensating variation to the
mean of the 249 household-speciﬁc compensating variations for each income percentile. But ﬁrst we
compare estimates of price and income elasticities from the homogeneous and the heterogeneous model.
8.1 Positive Analysis: Price and Income Elasticities
Let ei denote the income elasticity for good i, let eij denote the uncompensated price elasticity of good
i with respect to the price of good j and let ec
ij denote the compensated price elaticity. The price and
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where ˜ α, ˜ β and ˜ γ are the parameters in the homogenenous model and wi are the budget shares in
the homogenenous model. We estimate the elasticities from the homogeneous model by inserting the
parameter estimates from the homogenenous model of ˜ α, ˜ β and ˜ γ, as well as the predicted budget shares.
We estimate an elasticity in each data point (i.e. for each household at each time period) and construct
the ﬁnal elasticity as a weighted average across households and time, the weights being the household’s
expenditure on the good in question relative to the total expenditure on that good.
Similarly, we derive the model price and income elasticities of the conditional mean demand resulting
from the heterogeneous model. Let µβi denote the mean in the marginal distribution of the slope coeﬃ-
cient for good i,l e tE(·) denote the mean with respect to the joint distribution of parameters and let Gi
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ec
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We estimate the elasticities from the heterogeneous model by inserting the sample mean of the esti-
27mates of βi,H −1 PH
h=1 ˆ βih,f o rµβi and the sample mean of the mean of the product of βi with αj,
H−1 PH
h=1(ˆ βihˆ αjh), as well as the predicted budget shares from the conditional meand demand given
in (9). As above, we estimate an elasticity for each household at each time period and construct the
ﬁnal elasticity as the weighted average as described above. The results are depicted in the tables below
(bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses):
Income Elasticities
Food, Alcohol&Tobacco Clothing Leisure&Holidays Utilities
Homogeneous model .8005 (.0735) .9987 (.0970) 1.7858 (.1650) 1.2599 (.1158)
Heterogeneous model .9073 (.1130) 1.1286 (.1085) 1.4169 (.1147) 1.0268 (.1205)
The income elasticities for the luxury goods Leisure&Holidays and Utilities are in magnitude far smaller
in the heterogeneous model than in the model with no heterogeneity. This suggests that some of the
variation in the budget shares of these goods in the homogeneous model was wrongly contributed to
income, when in fact it was an income-independent taste diﬀerence, thus leading the income eﬀects to
being overestimated in the homogeneous model.
Compensated price elasticities: Homogeneous model
Food, Alcohol&Tobacco Clothing Leisure&Holidays Utilities
Food, Alcohol&Tobacco -.5021 (.0509) .1261 (.0432) -.0436 (.0203) .4399 (.0690)
Clothing .6612 (.0202) -1.1656 (.1105) .1990 (.0124) .3255 (.0243)
Leisure&Holidays -.8130 (.2266) .4323 (.0081) .4066 (.0881) -.2444 (.1818)
Utilities .8676 (.0726) .1308 (.0343) -.0192 (.0632) -.9488 (.1547)
Compensated price elasticities: Heterogeneous model
Food, Alcohol&Tobacco -.1536 (.0411) .0340 (.0817) -.1121 (.0619) .2408 (.0410)
Clothing .1716 (.1290) -.8945 (.4010) -.2451 (.1100) .9740 (.7501)
Leisure&Holidays -1.051 (.1182) -.4556 (.0862) 1.4560 (.3740) -.2461 (.6702)
Utilities .5213 (.0113) .3968 (.0625) -.0411 (.1294) -.8663 (.2002)
28Uncompensated price elasticities: Homogeneous model
Food, Alcohol&Tobacco Clothing Leisure&Holidays Utilities
Food, Alcohol&Tobacco -.9508 (.0950) .0382 (.0040) -.0958 (.0171) .2120 (.0358)
Clothing .1015 (.0107) -1.2754 (.1263) .1339 (.0026) .0413 (.0160)
Leisure&Holidays -1.8140 (.2501) .2360 (.0006) .2902 (.1074) -.7527 (.1915)
Utilities .1615 (.0465) -.0076 (.0042) -.1012 (.0365) -1.3074 (.2033)
Uncompensated price elasticities: Heterogeneous model
Food, Alcohol&Tobacco -.6606 (.1067) -.0602 (.0180) -.1936 (.0038) .0059 (.0221)
Clothing -.4592 (.1935) -1.0117 (.4854) -.3464 (.1736) .6818 (.6980)
Leisure&Holidays -1.8434 (.1858) .6028 (.1597) 1.3323 (.4391) -.6131 (.6139)
Utilities -.0528 (.0414) .2901 (.0953) -.1333 (.1583) -1.1323 (.1731)
All own price elasticities, bot uncompensated and compensated, are negative with the exception of the
own price elasticity for good 3. The reason e33 becomes positive is that the point estimate of γ33 is
positive in both models, leading e33 to being positive as well. In addition to this, the predicted budget
shares for good 3 are very small in both models (values ranging from very close to zero to .09, with
a mean of .05) implying that the point estimate for e33 becomes large in magnitude. Looking closer
at the parameter estimates of γ33 in both models, however, we see that the point estimates are highly
insigniﬁcant in both models. Moreover, then the standard errors in both models on the estimate of γ33
are much larger than the standard errors on any of the other price coeﬃcient estimates, suggesting that
γ33 is insigniﬁcant also relative to all the other price coeﬃcients. If we replace the estimate of γ33 in the
heterogeneous with a negative number in the conﬁdence interval of γ33, which is [-0.1201,0.3619], then
e33 is estimated to be negative. For example, if we use -.10 instead of the point estimate of γ33, we get
e33 = −1.9 (the compensated becomes -1.77), and if we insert -.001 we get e33 = −.59 (the compensated
becomes -.49). Hence we conclude, that the positive point estimate of the own price elasticity for good is
brought about by a highly insigniﬁcant positive point estimate of the price eﬀect for good 3 and is thus
insigniﬁcant in itself.
8.2 Welfare Eﬀects: An Illustrative Example
Given that integrability of the conditional mean is not rejected we conclude the paper with an illustrative
example that compares the estimated welfare eﬀects from the model that allows no heterogenity to
the estimated welfare eﬀects from the heterogeneous model following a tax increase which results in an
increase of the price of Food, Alcohol & Tobacco of 20%. We calculate the compensating variations
resulting from the heterogeneous model and from the benchmark case, homogeneous model, conditional
on income percentiles. The homogeneous model provides one CV for each income percentile, since all
consumers are assumed to have the same preferences. For the heterogeneous model, we calculate the
compensating variation for each household at each percentile. The comparison thus consists of comparing
29the conditional distribution of 249 compensating variations from the heteregenous model with one single
compensating variation provided by the homogeneous model for that income percentile.
The compensating variation (CV) is deﬁned as the amount by which the consumer would have to be
compensated after a price change to be as well oﬀ as before. Let p0 denote the price before the price
change and let p1 denote the price after the price change. Let x0 denote the (nominel) total expenditure
level of the consumer and let ψ denote the indirect utility function, then the CV is given as
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We consider the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the total expenditure distribution. The
results are below, all absolute numbers are in €.T h e ﬁrst table provides the CV’s resulting from the
homogeneous model for each percentile together with the means of the individual speciﬁcC V ’ sf o re a c h
percentile. The diﬀerence between the homogeneous CV and the mean of the household-speciﬁcC V ’ si s

















10th 44.2 46.4 2.2 339.4 .65 %
25th 62.5 68.6 6.1 518.1 1.18 %
50th 86.5 99.4 12.9 774.9 1.66 %
75th 117.0 141.0 24.0 1132.1 2.12 %
90th 152.5 192.8 40.3 1590.4 2.53 %
This table shows the compensation the homogeneous model prescribes is always lower than the mean of
the heterogeneous CV’s. The diﬀerences (undercompensations) between using the homogeneous model
and the means from the heterogeneous model range from .65 to 2.53 percent of the total budget across
the income disttribution. This indicated that using the homogeneous model is not far oﬀ when interest
lies in compensating the the consumer with the average CV. If, however, focus is not on compensating
the consumer with the average CV, the homogeneous model does not provide an answer. The conditional
distributions of CV’s, conditional on the diﬀerent income percentiles considered, are depicted in the table
below:
30CV distribution
Income distribution 5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
10th 33 36 41 46 53 57 61
25th 48 51 60 69 77 87 93
50th 61 70 85 99 114 128 153
75th 73 94 116 140 165 190 206
90th 90 117 160 192 229 270 362
Take for example the consumer with median income who has a CV in the 95th percentile of the conditional
distribution of the CV’s. This consumer should be compensated with 153€ according to the heteroge-
neous model, as compared to the 86.5€ prescribed by the homogeneous model. This consumer would
thus be undercompensated in the homogeneous model by 8.6 percent of his/her total budget, which is a
quite a large undercompensation. On the other hand, a consumer with a CV in the 5th percentile of the
CV distribution is overcompensated in the homogeneous model by 6.9 percent. In summary, it seems that
consumers lose out on compensations ranging between .65 to 2.53 percent of their total budgets if policy
recommendations were done following the homogeneous model, whereas the CV’s calculated from the
heterogeneous model show that some consumers would gain (and the government spending more money
than needed) and others would lose if policy recommendations were done equally for all consumers using
the calculations resulting from the homogeneous model. This example highlights the need for taking
unobservable heterogeneity into account in empirical demand analysis.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have carried out a panel data test of integrability of the conditional mean demand
accounting for unobservable heterogeneity in preferences. A uniquely long panel data set on household
expenditures allowed us to model individual demands as a set of heterogeneous Almost Ideal Demand
systems by allowing all the intercept and slope parameters of the demand system to be household-speciﬁc.
We do not reject integrability of the conditional mean demand: The tests for symmetry comes out with
p-values between 11 and 56 percent in favour of symmetry, and furthermore the rejection of the matrix of
covariances being the zero matrix showed that we have enough precision in our estimates to obtain a real
non-rejection. Hence we conclude that a set of heterogeneous Almost Ideal Demand systems generates a
conditional mean demand that is integrable. Given that integrability was not rejected, we compared the
demand system estimates obtained form a model with no heterogeneity to our heterogeneous demand
system estimates. This is interesting because the model with no heterogeneity is the model that has
usually been estimated in the empirical demand literature. Our ﬁndings are that the homogeneous model
severely overestimates income elasticities for luxury goods. This could be because the homogeneous model
wrongly contributes all of the variation in budget shares to income, when in fact some of the variation
is due to taste diﬀerences. An illustrative example of welfare eﬀects following a tax increase show that
compensating variations from the homogeneous model slightly undercompensates consumers as compared
to the mean of welfare eﬀects estimated from the heterogeneous model, but they are not very diﬀerent.
However, the substantial amount of heterogeneity in the welfare eﬀects from the heterogeneous model
31highlights the importance of taking unobservable heterogeneity into account.
This work could be extended by examining how sensitive the integrability test result is to the speciﬁ-
cation of individual demands. For example, individual demands could be modelled as an QUAID system,
which would allow for curvature in individual Engel curves. Or one could attempt to estimate individual
demands non-parametrically (for example by applying the non-parametric estimator for linear random
coeﬃcient models recently proposed in Hoderlein, Klemelä and Mammen (2007)); however, the 24 ob-
servations we have available per individual, which is a lot when it comes to parametric estimation, may
prove not to be enough in practice to estimate individual demand non-parametrically.
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34AD a t a
Table A.1. - Consumption Expenditures in the ECP
Commodity group Description
Food at home Food at home
Alcohol & tobacco Alcoholic drinks and tobacco
Clothing Clothing
Rent
Renting (including the money paid to the owner and
the water, but not electricity, heating etc.)
Energy Electricity, heating and petrol
Services
Furniture and appliances repairing, products for
cleaning, money paid to people for cleaning the
house and other household services
Medication Medical expenses
Transportation
Car repairing, public transportation and
communications (phone, mail, etc)
Leisure Books, cinemas and other entertainments
Education Education
Foodout Restaurants and cafeterias
Holiday Holidays
Other
Hairdressing, non-durables for personal care
(soap, cosmetics etc), pocket money given to children,
other services
Durables Durables (cars, furniture, tv, etc)








3: military service having worked before
4: retired








1: entrepreneurs or self-employed with employees
2: entrepreneurs or self-employed without employees
3: wage earners with a permanent job
4: wage earners with a temporary job







2: secondary school, ﬁrst level
3: secondary school, second level
4: secondary school, second level, professional studies
5: university degree (3 years)
6: university degree (5 years) and PhD’s















4: not documented, presumable missing
6: does not have a second house
36Table A.3 - Summary statistics in full data set and in sample
Husband’s employment status: Full data set Sample
Employed 77,97 79,47
Retired 18,66 17,00
Unemployed or out of labor force 3,37 3,53
Total 100 100
Husband’s occupational status
Wage earners with permanent job 63,56 61,67
Wage earners with temporary job 7,82 9,76
Self-employed 28,61 28,02




Less than 5 years of school 22,47 23,47
Primary school 60,05 62,00
Secondary school 10,45 6,93
University degree 3,79 2,66
Total 100 100
Housing tenure of main house:
Renters 19,3 16,77
Home owners 76,18 78,97
Other (free accomodation or missing) 3,89 4,26
Total 100 100
Housing tenure of second house:
Does not have a second house 90,18 86,93
O w ns e c o n dh o u s e 8,57 11,35
Rent or free accomodation or missing 1,25 1,72
Total 100 100









Food at home 100.434 56.319 74.369 43.357
Alcohol & tobacco 8.640 9.713 6.585 7.403
Clothing 21.336 22.790 14.351 14.927
Rent 13.298 49.246 9.811 40.032
Energy 17.331 19.622 12.587 14.326
Services 4.711 7.447 3.041 4.125
Medication 4.552 10.666 3.132 7.465
Transportation 9.198 15.989 5.748 9.570
Leisure 7.635 12.820 5.696 10.505
Education 6.431 14.459 4.048 9.439
Foodout 2.202 13.591 1.388 9.860
Holidays 6.398 29.807 4.548 17.427
Other 17.702 29.807 12.767 20.829
Durables 32.006 91.541 22.006 68.002
Total Expenditure 182.365 134.273 180.076 132.589
Husband’s age 51,24 11,89 51,78 11,15
Wife’s age 48,61 11,95 49,15 11,26
Number of children 1,27 1,36 1,32 1,39
Number of adults 2,55 0,80 2,72 0,90
Total household size 3,97 1,54 4,04 1,60
22These are pooled means and standard deviations, based on all respectively 21668 and 5976 observations.
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Figure 1: The variation in relative prices during the sample period.
B Empirical Results
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Figure 10: Individual Engel curves for Leisure & Holidays.
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